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IN THE COURT OF APPEA 
DIAMOND PARKING, INC., 
a Washington Corporation, 
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vs . 
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Small Claims 
upon the reasonable value to repair the ticket dispensing 
machine? 
3. Was there sufficient admissible competent evidence 
to support the lower court's findings of fact and conclusions 
of law? 
4. Is Mortimer's appeal frivolous and is Diamond enti-
tled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs in 
having to defend the appeal? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For the convenience of the Court, a transcript of the 
trial proceedings is attached hereto as Addendum No. 1. 
1. At approximately 6 p.m. in the evening of March 
31, 1987, the defendant Mortimer entered Diamond's parking 
lot at 310 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, by entering 
off of Post Office Place and proceeding north towards an atten-
dant booth and ticket dispensing machine located near the 
end of the driveway leading into the parking lot. (Tr. 2-3, 
5-7) A photograph of the driveway leading into the parking 
lot showing the attendant booth and ticket dispensing machine, 
which was provided to the trial judge, is attached hereto 
as Addendum No. 2. 
2. Defendant Mortimer and his wife intended to have 
dinner at the China Village Restaurant which is located on 
the corner of Main Street and Post Office Place. (Tr. 5) 
A photograph showing the parking area to the east of the atten-
dant booth and north of the China Village Restaurant, which 
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was provided to the trial judge, is attached hereto as Addendum 
No. 3. 
3. Defendant Mortimer stopped at the attendant booth 
and inquired of the attendant, David Rice, what the procedure 
was for obtaining a validation to avoid paying for parking. 
Rice told Mortimer to go ahead and park and that the China 
Village Restaurant would validate his parking ticket. (Tr. 
2, 5) 
i 
4. Rather than parking in the lot behind the China 
Village Restaurant, defendant Mortimer proceeded directly 
forward and north of the Diamond lot and proceeded down a 
loading dock ramp located in the rear of and below the J. 
C. Penney office tower located at 310 South Main Street. 
(Tr. 2-3, 5) A true and correct copy of a photograph of the 
loading dock, which was provided to the trial judge, is attached 
hereto as Addendum No. 4. 
5. When defendant Mortimer reached the end of the 
loading dock and discovered that it only led to the basement 
of the building, he proceeded to back up the loading dock. 
He continued to back up onto the parking lot and thereafter 
proceeded to continue backing up across the lot until he hit 
the stationary ticket dispensing machine. (Tr. 5) A photograph 
showing the view of the ticket dispensing machine from the 
rear window of an automobile at the top of the loading dock, 
which was provided to the trial judge, is attached hereto 
as Addendum No. 5. 
6. The impact of Mortimer's vehicle damaged the ticket 
dispensing machine and Diamond was required to have it repaired 
by replacement of rotors, case switches, mounting bolts and 
labor in the amount of $213.56. (Tr. 3) The invoice for 
the repair costs from Time and Instrument Center, which was 
submitted to the trial judge, is attached hereto as Addendum 
No. 6. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant Mortimer was negligent as a matter of law in 
failing to keep a proper lookout and in backing into the clearly 
visible bright orange stationary ticket dispensing machine. 
The instructions of Diamond's parking attendant, David Rice, 
to go ahead and park and the restaurant would validate the 
ticket, does not constitute contributory negligence nor was 
it the proximate cause of the accident. It is obvious and 
apparent to a reasonably prudent driver that parking for the 
China Village Restaurant is outside or behind the restaurant 
and the parking area was open and visible. Defendant Mortimer's 
decision to proceed down a loading ramp behind and below the 
J. C. Penney Office Tower was not justified or reasonable. 
Furthermore, defendant Mortimer failed to keep a proper lookout 
and backed into the ticket dispensing machine which is clearly 
visible out of the rear window of a vehicle from the top of 
the loading dock. As the trial judge observed, the defendant 
proceeded past the fixed object, took a ticket from it and 
was aware of its location which was open and visible. (Tr. 
6) The parking lot attendant testified that Mortimer backed 
into the ticket machine and the defendant himself admitted 
at trial that he backed into and hit the machine (Tr. 7), 
and that he "does not contest the amount it cost plaintiff 
to have the damage repaired." (Mortimer Brief at 10) Accord-
inglyf judgment for Diamond was proper and the appeal is clearly 
frivolous and without merit which justifies an award of reason-
able attorney's fees and costs to Diamond for having to respond. 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT MORTIMER WAS NEGLIGENT IN BACKING HIS 
VEHICLE INTO AND DAMAGING A STATIONARY PARKING 
TICKET DISPENSER AND DIAMOND'S PARKING 
ATTENDANT WAS NOT CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT. 
Diamond submits that failure to keep proper lookout and 
carelessly backing a vehicle into a fixed and visible object 
is negligence as a matter of law. See, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-106 
Repl. Vol. 5A (1981) . I 
The law is well settled that the duty of an operator 
of a motor vehicle is to exercise ordinary, reasonable, or 
due care which a careful and prudent person would exercise 
under the circumstances or to be liable for injuries proximately 
resulting from failure to meet that duty of care. Malan v. 
Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 672 (Utah 1984); 7 Am.Jur. 2d § 414, 
"Automobiles and Highway Traffic" n. 50 and cases cited therein. 
Further, a driver is "chargeable with knowledge of objects 
on the highway which are in plain view." Id. at §416 n. 83. 
In backing a vehicle, a motorist has the duty to exercise 
ordinary care under the circumstances to avoid injury to proper-
ty and backing without taking necessary precautions under 
the circumstances constitutes negligence. Seef 7 Am.Jur. 
2d §872 "Automobiles and Highway Traffic" n. 86 and 87 and 
cases cited therein. The duty to keep a proper lookout is 
well recognized and a motorist is "charged with seeing what 
there was to be seen . . . ." Wardell v. Jerman, 18 Utah 
2d 359, 423 P.2d 485, 487 (1967); Hughes v. Hooper, 19 Utah 
2d 389, 431 P.2d 983, 984 (1967). 
The duty of an operator of a motor vehicle being backed 
on private property has been recognized in numerous cases 
to include such lookout as is reasonably demanded by the circum-
stances to avoid injury which may be caused by the maneuver. 
See, Annotation "Automobiles - Backing - Private Premises" 
63 A.L.R. 2d 184, 193 § 4 and cases cited therein. The law 
is well settled that backing into a stationary object is negli-
gent. Anderson v. Parson Red-E-Mix Paving Co., 24 Utah 2d 
128, 467 P.2d 45, 46-47 (1970); see, Annotation "Duty and 
Liability of Vehicle Drivers Within Parking Lot" 62 A.L.R. 
2d 288, 291 § 3 "Collision with Parked Vehicle or Other Station-
ary Object" and cases cited therein. 
The suggestion that Diamond's attendant was contributorily 
negligent or proximately caused the accident is without merit. 
Failure to observe and avoid hitting a clearly visible object 
is the " . . . sole proximate cause of the collision . . . " 
Anderson, supra at 47. In response to the defendant Mortimer's 
question as to how he could avoid paying for parking and obtain 
a validation, the attendant merely advised him to go ahead 
and park and have the restaurant validate the parking ticket. 
As the judge found, this was clearly not a directional instruc-
tion to proceed down the loading dock as opposed to parking 
in the obvious and visible parking lot in front of and visible 
to defendant. 
Defendant's reliance on the cases of Dixon v. Stewart, 
658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982) and Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 
P.2d 728 (1984) is misplaced. Neither case is apposite. 
Dixon held that introduction of expert medical testimony was 
proper to explain effects of marijuana usage by plaintiff's 
decedent minutes before he walked out and faltered in the 
street in front of an oncoming vehicle. Dixon, supra, at 
597-598. Acculog, held that failure to carry a fire extin-
guisher in a van which burned did not contribute to the injury 
which was caused by negligent servicing of the vehicle. Acculog 
supra, at 730. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED DIAMOND A JUDGMENT FOR 
DAMAGES FOR THE REASONABLE COST TO REPAIR 
THE DAMAGED TICKET DISPENSER. 
The law is well settled that damages for injury to property 
from negligence are properly calculated by the reasonable 
value to repair the damage. See, 22 Am.Jur. 2d "Damages" 
§ 142 at 206. The invoice submitted for the repairs is perti-
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nent to show the amount of damage. See, Power v. Taylor, 
14 Utah 2d 152, 379 P.2d 380, 381 (1963). It was also appro-
priate to award costs to Diamond as the prevailing party. See, 
Utah Code Ann. § 7 8-6-15 Repl. Vol. 9 (1987) . 
POINT III 
THERE IS SUFFICIENT ADMISSIBLE COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT THE LOWER COURT1S FINDINGS OF FACTf 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW WERE PROPERLY MADE. 
The defendant Mortimer's negligent operation of his vehicle 
was clearly established by the eyewitness testimony of Rice. 
(Tr. 2-5) Mortimer himself admitted hitting the ticket machine. 
(Tr. 7) The amount of damage was established by the repair 
invoice (Tr. 3, Addendum No. 6) and is not disputed. (Mortimer 
Brief at 10). The trial judge made an appropriate finding 
and ccnclusions of negligence and damages at the close of 
the evidence. (Tr. 8) 
The trial ccurt also properly ruled that discussions 
or negotiations between the parties concerning settlement 
are inadmissible. Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
clearly provides that discussions between the parties concerning 
settlement were inadmissible. Furthermore, the Court properly 
found that while defendant made an offer of settlement for 
roughly half the amount of the repair costs, John Smistad 
advised him that it would have to be reviewed and approved 
by Diamond and that he would not be authorized to accept the 
settlement without such approval. Accordingly, the Court 
was correct in finding insufficient meeting of the minds for 
-8-
any accord or satisfaction. The evidence that the check prof-
fered by the defendant for one-half the repair costs was re-
jected and was not cashed, clearly establishes that no settle-
ment was reached. Furthermore, it does not appear that defen-
dant has properly raised this issue on appeal. 
POINT IV 
DIAMOND SHOULD BE AWARDED REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES 
AND COSTS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS, 
Both under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this 
Court has the right to award attorney's fees and costs for 
an appeal which is without merit, net asserted in good faith, 
frivolous or which needlessly increases the costs of litigation. 
Diamond submits that appealing a judgment where the defendant 
does not contest the amount of the damage and admits that 
he backed into and damaged the plaintiff's property, is totally 
frivolous, without merit and justifies an award of reasonable 
attorney's fees for having to respond to Appellant's brief. 
Under the circumstances and in light of the amount of the 
judgment, a reasonable award of attorney's fees and costs 
is $250.00. 
CONCLUSION 
The undisputed eyewitness testimony at trial in this 
case established that the defendant negligently backed his 
vehicle into and damaged the plaintiff's property. Defendant 
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does not deny that fact nor does he contest the amount of 
the damage he caused. Defendant was negligent and breached 
a duty to keep a proper lookout while backing up his vehicle. 
The damage award was based upon the proper measure of the 
reasonable value to repair the property. The testimony with 
regard to settlement negotiations demonstrates that no settle-
ment was reached. Regardless, such evidence is inadmissible. 
Accordingly, the defendant's appeal of the case is clearly 
without merit and is not predicated upon any good faith argu-
ment. The appeal is frivolous and has resulted in imposing 
upon the plaintiff unreasonable increased expens in the litiga-
tion for which plaintiff should be awarded reasonable attorney's 
fees and costs. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this , ?feJ day of September, 
1987. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
NDALL TRUEBLOOD 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this offl^ day of September, 
1987, I deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, 
a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF 
RESPONDENT DIAMOND PARKING, INC. to the following: 
George H. Mortimer 
3687 N. Little Rock Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Pro Se 
Tabl 
ADDENDUM NO. 1 
DIAMOND PARKING, INC. 
vs. 
GEORGE MORTIMER 
Transcript of Small Claims Court Hearing 
No. 870295CA 
June 30, 1987 
Judge Donald Sawaya Presiding 
Judge Sawaya Okay, who's here on behalf of Diamond Parking? 
John Smistad I am, Your Honor. Ifm city manager for 
Salt Lake City. My name's John Smistad 
and this is David Rice, who's our booth 
attendant, works for me. 
Judge Sawaya John Smistad? 
John Smistad Smistad, S, M, I, S, T, A, D 
Judge Sawaya And your witness' name is? 
John Smistad David Rice 
David Rice David Rice . . . . 
Judge Sawaya I can spell that. And you're George Mortimer? 
George Mortimer Yes, I am, Your Honor. 
Judge Sawaya Gentlemen, if you'd all stand, the clerk 
can swear you. 
Clerk Raise your right hand: Do you swear that 
the testimony you are about to give is the 
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the 
truth, so help you, God. 
Witnesses Yes. 
Judge Sawaya Okay, Mr. Smistad, I assume you're here 
representive of the plaintiff. 
John Smistad Yes, I am. 
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Judge Sawaya 
George Mortimer 
Judge Sawaya 
John Smistad 
Judge Sawaya 
John Smistad 
Judge Sawaya 
David Rice 
Judge Sawaya 
David Rice 
Judge Sawaya 
David Rice 
Can you tell me what's this is all about. 
Ah, Your Honor, ah, may I question his authority 
to represent Diamond Parking? I have a 
very good reason why I question. 
Well, when it's your turn to speak, you 
certainly may. Okay, Mr. Smistad. 
On March 31st of this year [1987], the defendant, 
Mr. Mortimer backed into one of our ticket 
spitter machines which is a device that 
issues tickets that have the date and the 
time printed on them so we know what to 
charge our customers when they leave our 
parking lot. 
Is that the little gadget that, where you 
pull the ticket out and the gate goes up? 
Yes, sir. Push a button. Yeah, 
comes out. It's located at 310 
Mr. Mortimer backed into one of 
and caused damage to it, and he 
and a ticket 
South Main, 
those devices 
admits that 
he did it and we have eyewitnesses that, 
that this occurred and we feel that he's 
responsible for the full amount of the damages 
which came in the end to $213.56. 
Okay, a, Mr. Rice, I assume you're that 
witness. 
Yes, exactly. 
Why don't you tell me what happened. 
Okay, it was approximately about five, ten 
after six, I get there at ten to six to 
get the tickets from around the, the parking 
lot. Urn, I was finishing my paper work 
and he came in and I told him to take a 
ticket for China Village which is on the 
right and they validate. Urn, I didn't tell 
him where to go, I just, you know, I assumed 
that he knew where he was going . . . . 
Why don't you just tell me what happened, 
don't tell me what you . . . . 
Okay, and so he pulled ahead into the loading 
dock which goes down and then pulled back, 
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Judge Sawaya 
David Rice 
Judge Sawaya 
David Rice 
Judge Sawaya 
John Smistad 
Judge Sawaya 
John Smistad 
Judge Sawaya 
John Smistad 
Judge Sawaya 
John Smistad 
I looked up and the ticket spitter went 
out and he had backed into the ticket spitter 
and I was, I, I, another guy was there who's 
not here, Jonathon Clark, and he left the 
scene completely, people started . . . 
Okay, yeah, ah, you saw who was operating 
the car that backed into your machine. 
Exactly, exactly. 
You, you saw that and is he present in the 
court today? 
Okay, yes, Mr. Mortimer. 
Okay. Is there anything else you want to 
tell me about. Either of you. 
Yes, Your Honor, a, the loading dock that 
Mr. Mortimer drove into a, was located directly 
in front of the attendant booth, and the, 
the ticket spitter machine in question. 
I've been working here since February 11th 
and David started working for Diamond Parking 
here in Salt Lake City exactly a week before 
on February 4th, we have never seen a customer 
pull into that loading dock believing that 
that was a parking area. 
Okay. 
I've also got pictures of, to give you an 
idea what we're talking about. 
Well, let's see them. 
Okay. 
How did you determine your repair costs? 
I've got a bill for that too. Ah, it actually 
took to repair the, the ticket spitter properly 
over a month, almost a month to get the 
repairs effected and I've got a bill from 
Time and Instrument Clock Center who actually 
repaired the ticket spitter. This is [inaudible] 
incident report that was filled out by David 
on the night that the, the event happened 
and this is the a, the copy of the invoice 
we received from Time and Instrument Clock 
Center repair for damages. The idea was 
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that I send direct to home office in Seattle 
for them These pictures show the 
loading dock in question that he pulled 
down into that's from the attendant booth. 
This is the ticket spitter, you can see 
where his car backed into the, the body 
of the machine. This is the view looking 
down into the loading dock from the top, 
from the summit. This is a view of the 
ticket spitter itself from loading 
dock. This is a shot that I took at the 
top of the loading dock looking down into 
it. Close-up of what the sign states. 
This is a shot taken up to at our attendant 
booth from the bottom of the loading dock, 
the loading dock area itself. A shot of 
the attendant booth and the ticket spitter 
taken from the top of the loading dock. 
This I'm showing to you because its fairly 
obvious where to park that's what it looks 
like at 6 o'clock in the parking lot in 
question, and as you can see plenty of spaces 
to park. This is the other area. You can 
see the top of the ticket spitter we're 
talking about. There is also spaces there 
to park. This is a shot from my car looking 
down into the loading dock. I think it's 
fairly obvious that that is a loading dock, 
not a parking area . . . This is a shot 
looking out the back window of my car as 
you're backing out, the top of the loading 
dock, you can see the ticket spitter . . 
.attendant booth. This is a shot standing 
ahead looking out over the ticket spitter 
into 
Judge Sawaya Why don't you show those to Mr. Mortimer, 
okay, and 
John Smistad Okay, By the way, Your Honor, a Mr. Mortimer 
in response to a, a letter that I had sent 
to him in May, he sent me a check for half 
the amount, one hundred and seven dollars 
which I, which you can see, I have not cashed. 
On the back it says endorsement constitutes 
a full release of payor from all further 
liability to the endorser. I did not sign 
that, I probably should also show you this. 
This is a letter that he had sent me ah, 
which essentially is, gives a release of 
his liability which. . . . 
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Judge Sawaya Okay, is that all that Diamond Parking has 
to tell me? 
John Smistad Yes, Your Honor, it is. 
Judge Sawaya Okay, Mr. Mortimer, sir. 
George Mortimer Ah, I would like to have Mr. Smistad ah, 
bring to the court's attention the authority 
under which he appears to represent Diamond 
Parking. The reason I ask that is that 
ah, prior to writing this letter that he 
just showed you on May 29, I talked with 
him on the phone and explained to him how 
my wife and I came to the ticket booth in 
April and ah, this was the first time we 
had parked for a Chinese restaurant, and 
the attendant, I asked the attendant, what 
we would do to get the ticket validated 
so that I didn't have to pay the parking 
fee after we had gone to the restaurant. 
The attendant said go ahead and park, and 
get the restaurant to validate your ticket. 
Now, the only way we could go ahead was 
down that ramp, so we went down the ramp 
and when we got to the bottom of the ramp, 
we found there was no place to park. Looking 
at the rear view mirror, I saw that people 
were coming in and then turning to the right 
immediately into a parking lot on the same 
level as the ticket booth, so I had to back 
up in order to get to that parking lot and 
in doing so, I ran into the ticket booth. 
Now, when I explained this to Mr. Smistad, 
I told him I thought I was not completely 
responsible for the condition because if 
in#tead of being told to go ahead and park, 
I had been told turn to the right and park, 
the thing never would have happened and 
he agreed with me in this oral conversation 
and agreed also that if I would pay half 
of the damage, he would accept that payment 
as full, my full responsibility and would 
give me a release from any further responsibility. 
So I wrote the letter of May 29, sent him 
a check for a hundred and seventy, a hundred 
and seven dollars, which is slightly more 
than half. He called me up a few days later, 
and said somebody in higher authority than 
he had refused to accept the settlement. 
Now, if there's somebody in higher authority 
than he then he has to show that he has 
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authority from that higher authority to 
represent them here and that whatever decision 
needs to be made to resolve the case. Now, 
he said that he was hired, or that is that 
he started working for them in February 
which was before this accident occurred, 
if he doesn't have anything more to show 
for his authority than the fact that's he's 
manager here, he had the same authority 
when we talked about settlement that he 
has now, so that he either lacks the authority 
to do anything today or he had the authority 
and the agreement we made is binding. 
Judge Sawaya Well, I'm having a tough time reaching your 
argument, counsel. Ah, in the first place 
settlement negotiations as you know, are 
privileged. In the second place, he may 
be the manager and does not have authority 
to compromise claims against his company 
and appearing here to represent the company, 
which is permissible under statute, does 
not necessarily require him to have authority 
to compromise them. Ah, now, if you're 
attempting to plead to, to plead some sort 
of accord and satisfaction or some sort 
of arrangement to compromise for a lesser 
sum, you haven't made it, ah, you know, 
I haven't heard anything yet that would 
indicate a, a meeting of the minds to accept 
a lesser sum. And frankly, I think its 
immaterial which way you were directed or 
if you misinterpreted the instructions to 
go ahead and park, as one meaning ahead, 
meaning direction, rather than to proceed. 
Ah, even if you had been misdirected down 
the ramp, that's no reason to back up the 
ramp and back into a fixed object. I think 
due care and caution on your part would 
have avoided the accident, even assuming 
that you had been misdirected. Its a fixed 
object, its open, its visible, it isn't 
hidden, you had driven past it, I assume 
you stopped and took a ticket from it and 
ah, you know, I, I'm just not with you. 
I don't understand what the relevance is 
about the claim that you were misdirected, 
therefore you can back into a fixed object 
and I'd like some help in that matter. 
George Mortimer Well, I understood the directions from the 
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attendant go ahead and park to mean to go, 
to go forward. 
Judge Sawaya 
George Mortimer 
Judge Sawaya 
George Mortimer 
Judge Sawaya 
George Mortimer 
Judge Sawaya 
George Mortimer 
Judge Sawaya 
John Smistad 
Oh, I understand that. 
And the only way to go forward was down 
the ramp. 
And you went down the ramp. 
Now, I went down the ramp 
and there was no place to park down there. 
The only, only way to get out is to back 
up. 
Okay. 
So I backed up and ah, I ah, have a little 
difficulty turning my head clear around 
Your Honor, because of, of arthritis in 
my neck so I ah, backed up the ramp [Side 
One of the Tape stops . . . Goes to Side 
Two] . . . . The ah, the back of the car 
to the left so I could turn right into the 
parking lot on the level of the ticket booth 
and in doing so, I did back into the ticket 
stand because I could not see it clearly 
either through the rear view mirror as far 
as I could turn my head. Now, I don't deny 
that I backed into the ticket booth, Your 
Honor, I did that but ah, my position is 
that following the directions as I understood 
them from the attendant, I had to, I did 
go down the ramp then I had to back up and 
ah, when I talked to Mr. Smistad on the 
telephone about it prior to the May 29 letter, 
we had a complete meeting of the minds, 
Your Honor, with respect to the payment 
of half of the damages. There was no misunderstanding 
whatever between us. Therefore, I wrote 
the letter, sent the check and ah, put a 
release on the letter so that it could be 
signed and returned. 
What about it, Mr. Smistad? 
I indicated that I would have to check with 
my home office in Seattle and they were 
not willing to accept half the damages, 
they wanted the full amount, therefore, 
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I didn't cash the check or sign this agreement 
letter. 
George Mortimer 
John Smistad 
Judge Sawaya 
John Smistad 
George Mortimer 
Judge Sawaya 
John Smistad 
Judge Sawaya 
John Smistad 
George Mortimer 
Judge Sawaya 
There was, there was no such statement made 
to me, Your Honor. He, he agreed that the 
amount that I offered would ah settle the 
whole matter. That's the reason I sent 
the check with the release on it. There 
was no reference made whatever to higher, 
having to seek higher authority. 
It didn't satisfy the company and I didn't 
cash his check. I didn't take his money. 
Okay, is there anything else that either 
side has. Plaintiff? 
No, Your Honor. 
No, Your Honor. 
You both rest? 
Yes. 
Both submit the matter? 
Yes, Your Honor. 
Yes, Your Honor. 
Having heard the evidence, the Court finds 
that Mr. Mortimer did in fact back into 
the property of the plaintiff and damaged 
the same. The Court finds damages amount 
to two hundred and thirteen dollars and 
fifty-six cents. The Court further finds 
that there was no valid settlement of claim 
or compromise. Based upon the foregoing, 
plaintiff is entitled to judgment in the 
sum of two hundred and thirteen dollars 
fifty-six cents, interest from the date 
of judgment and costs. 
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